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ABSTRACT 
The intent of this thesis is to examine the future of the third-party doctrine with the 
proliferation of technology and the online data we are surrounded with daily, specifically after the 
United States Supreme Court’s decision in Carpenter v. United States. In order to better understand the 
Supreme Court’s reasoning in that case, this thesis will review the history of the third-party doctrine 
and its roots in United States v. Miller and Smith v. Maryland. A review of Fourth Amendment history 
and jurisprudence is also crucial to this thesis, as it is imperative that individuals do not forfeit their 
Constitutional guarantees for the benefit of living in a technologically advanced society. This 
requires an understanding of the modern-day functional equivalents of “papers” and “effects.” 
Furthermore, this thesis will ultimately answer the following question: Why is it legally significant 
that we protect at least some data that comes from technologies that our forefathers could have 
never imagined under the Fourth Amendment? 
Looking to the future, this thesis will contemplate solutions on how to move forward in this 
technology era. It will scrutinize the relevancy of the third-party doctrine due to the rise of 
technology and the enormous amount of information held about us by third parties. In the past, the 
Third-Party Doctrine may have been good law, but that time has passed. It is time for the Third-
Party Doctrine to be abolished so the Fourth Amendment can join the 21st Century.  
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INTRODUCTION 
  
Our world has evolved. Modern society is largely dependent on technology, and there is a 
never-ending appetite for scientific development; there is often new technology released that is 
making our lives more convenient, and more connected, than ever. Each click and internet search 
leaves a digital trail to be stored and stitched together to reveal an individual’s innermost private life. 
Current law provides little privacy protection to individuals, undermining our Fourth Amendment 
safeguard that many hold essential to our individual freedoms. The Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution1 states that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
[w]arrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.”  
There is a consensus in the basic meaning of the Fourth Amendment; it is intended to 
guarantee Americans the right to be secure against “unreasonable searches and seizures” conducted 
by the government. The term “unreasonable” or reasonable has become a basic principle that has 
been used to guide authority. However, in today’s increasingly digitally connected world where we 
have little choice but to use the internet to function in today’s society, there is a concern as to what 
exactly is “reasonable” because many our smart devices share our information with third parties. In 
fact, in a world where digital technology has revolutionized the way we conduct our daily business, 
many of us increasingly feel like we do not have an expectation of privacy.2 
 
1 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
2 See Scenario ONE: The New Normal, Ctr. for Long-Term Cybersecurity, U.C. Berkeley, 
https://cltc.berkeley.edu/scenario/scenario-one/ (suggesting that by 2020, most of our information 
will be kept online, leaving people vulnerable to data breaches, government intervention, and public 
display of sensitive information) (last visited Oct. 26, 2019). 
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This sharing of information has led to a growing privacy gap that denies Fourth Amendment 
protection, specifically the “Third-Party Doctrine.” In a briefing to Members of Congress, the 
Congressional Research Service described the Third-Party Doctrine as follows: 
 
In these cases, the Court held that people are not entitled to an expectation of 
privacy in information they voluntarily provide to third parties. This legal 
proposition, known as the third-party doctrine, permits the government access to, as 
a matter of Fourth Amendment law, a vast amount of information about individuals, 
such as the websites they visit; who they have emailed; the phone numbers they dial; 
and their utility, banking, and education records, just to name a few.3 
 
In our increasingly digital world, companies hold a vast majority of information on behalf of their 
customers, which we have voluntarily provided. Information that is voluntarily provided is not 
protected by the Fourth Amendment, as the Court has held that the information that “[w]hat a 
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth 
Amendment protection.”4 The doctrine has made it so the government can access information with 
a standard below probable cause.5 This standard should be reassessed to fit into our digital age. 
Property law, reasonable expectation of privacy, and the trespass doctrine, to name a few standards 
of deciding what is private, are not promising steppingstones on which to continue to base Fourth 
Amendment claims. 
 
3 RICHARD M. THOMPSON II, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43586, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT THIRD-
PARTY DOCTRINE, at 15 (2014). 
4 Id. at 10 citing Miller v. United States, 425 U.S. at 442 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 
351 (1967)). 
5 Margaret E. Twomey, Voluntary Disclosure of Information as a Proposed Standard for the Fourth 
Amendment’s Third-Party Doctrine, 21 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 401, 402 (2015).  
3 
 
Technological advancements and proliferation of third-party records since the doctrine’s 
inception in two Supreme Court cases decided in the late 1970s, United States v. Miller6 and Smith v. 
Maryland7, raise questions about the stability of this Doctrine in modern society.  
The way the Court has historically looked at the Fourth Amendment is analogous to a 
patchwork quilt; the Supreme Court tries to fix privacy concerns by considering technological 
advances one-by-one rather than considering what will come next or how one decision could impact 
future technologies. Katz,8 Jones v. United States,9and Riley v. California10 are historical Supreme Court 
cases that exhibit this piecemeal approach. 
As technology transforms the way people participate in society, the core protections of the 
Fourth Amendment to feel secure in one’s person, homes, papers, and effects are beginning to 
erode. Because of the third-party doctrine, the government can obtain any information a person has 
disclosed to a third party, as a warrant is not required for police to search and seize consumers’ 
private data on the internet.11 Instead, the government, or its actors, can issue a subpoena to a third 
party as a means to capture desired information.12 For this purpose, a third party is a reference to 
any non-governmental institution. The third-party doctrine, therefore, allows the government to 
circumvent our Constitutional guarantees because they do not have a need for warrants. Through 
interpretation of the third-party doctrine, the Fourth Amendment would not guarantee the privacy 
of personal data held by private companies, should the government request the information.  
 
6 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 436 (1976). 
7 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 739 (1979). 
8 Katz, 389 U.S. at 347. 
9 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
10 Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014). 
11 Christopher Slobogin, Subpeonas and Privacy, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 805, 809 (2005).  
12 Id. at 810.  
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In this way, the third-party doctrine serves as a general warrant because it is a blanket request 
that provides government access to vast amounts of information retained by third-party service 
providers. General warrants were antithetical to the Founders wishes at the founding of our country, 
and this should be carried through in the interpretation today. 
Carpenter v. United States is the most recent Supreme Court case that takes issue with the third-
party doctrine, specifically focusing on the relatively new issue of cell-site location information, or 
CSLI. In writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts expressed that Carpenter was a narrow ruling 
that left existing precedent undisturbed and would not require, in most cases, a warrant for 
information held by third-party companies.13 However, because the ruling was limited in only 
applying to CSLI, it remains unclear exactly what additional information is protected. 
The claim raised is not only that we must reevaluate the Third-Party Doctrine and the way it 
impacts our life both now and, in the future, but also the impetus to reevaluate the Fourth 
Amendment as it relates to technology and the law. This thesis will first review the Court’s 21st-
century technology Third-Party Doctrine-related Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to examine how 
the current paved path for privacy rights is doomed to fail. This thesis will then examine how the 
current understanding of the Doctrine applies to certain digital information like the information in 
Carpenter. The author will then consider a few specific types of technology that stores our data and 
how the privacy we voluntarily share can be used against us in this digital age, particularly, how 
digital technologies threaten to exclude immeasurable quantities of personal information from 
Fourth Amendment protection. In conclusion, this thesis will review current theories of privacy and 
offer suggestions on how to proceed. 
 
13 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018). 
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THE LANGUAGE AND HISTORY OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
 
To discuss the inconsistencies of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourth 
Amendment, a review of the origins and history is imperative. The first clause of the Fourth 
Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures, while the second clause explicitly bans 
the use of “general warrants.”  
The Warrant Clause, which is understood to be the second clause of the text, is thought to 
regulate warrant authority.14 This clause is believed to ban the use of “general warrants,” which are 
blanket warrants that can be obtained without an “adequate showing of cause.”15 They “allowed 
officers to search wherever they wanted and to seize whatever they wanted, with few exceptions.”16 
The Founding Fathers “sought to prevent unjustified searches and searchers” from 
occurring in the first place17; regardless of their location, the Founders desired protections for 
personal items.18 Moreover, unlike the real property discussed in the text of the Amendment, effects 
could be carted away by the government. The Founders did not seek a post-intrusion remedy; 
instead they implemented a deterrent to the government issuance of a nonspecific warrant.19 Should 
an officer seize an item without a valid warrant, and the officer’s actions be deemed unreasonable, 
he could be sued by the citizen whose person, house, papers, or effects had been trespassed upon.20 
 
14 Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 557 (1999). 
15 Id. at 558.  
16
 LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 153 (1999). 
17 Id. at 576.  
18 Maureen E. Brady, The Lost “Effects” of the Fourth Amendment: Giving Personal Property Due Protection, 
125 YALE L.J. 946, 985 (2016) (“Dictionaries from the period indicate that ‘effects’ was synonymous 
with personal property”). 
19 LEVY, supra note 16, at 577.  
20 Akhil Reed Amar, The Fourth Amendment, Boston, and the Writs of Assistance, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 
53, 60 (1996). 
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The Founders’ goal in eliminating general warrants was to ensure that the oppressive 
practices of the crown in Great Britain could not be used in their new nation. Famous English cases 
involving the search and seizure of papers in an effort to silence critics of the King struck a nerve 
with many of the Colonies. The first of these cases surrounds Mr. John Wilkes, who was accused of 
writing articles mocking the King and his ministers.21 Wilkes was subjected to an invasive search 
under a general warrant and subsequently arrested.22 Wilkes brought trespass actions against the 
officers who searched his property, enforcing his right to security in his house; the jury ruled in 
favor of Wilkes.23 
 The second case, which arose out of similar circumstances to Wilkes, was Entick v. 
Carrington24 a cornerstone case that “foreshadowed the requirements of the fourth amendment’s 
search and seizure clause by holding that seizures of certain papers are impermissibly intrusive.”25 In 
Entick, the Secretary of State authorized a warrant to search for some documents on Entick’s land.26 
In carrying out the warrant, many of Entick’s books, papers, and pamphlets were seized.27 Entick 
sued for trespass, leading the court to condemn the search and seizure, the court holding that the 
government could not seize private papers even with a valid warrant.28 For the court, the issue was 
 
21 Eric Schnapper, Unreasonable Searches and Seizures of Papers, 71 VA. L. REV. 869, 887 (1985). 
22 Id. at 887. Wilkes was not specifically named in the warrant, nor did the warrant 
specify items to be seized nor particular places to be searched.  
23 Id. at 879.  
24 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765). For a complete account on the Entick 
decision, look to the Howell's State Trials. They present ‘the Judgment itself at length, as delivered 
by the Lord Chief Justice of the Common-Pleas from written notes.’ 19 How. St. Tr. at 1029. 
25 Schnapper, supra note 21, at 877. 
26 Id. at 881. 
27 Id. at 880 (citing 19 How. St. Tr. at 1030-32). 
28 Id. at 876-77 (citing Entick, 19 How. St. Tr. at 1073, 95 Eng. Rep. at 818). 
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much deeper than the physical trespass; rather it was “the indefeasible rights of personal security, 
liberty, and private property.”29 
The Wilkes and Entick controversies served as an impetus to the Founding Fathers to ensure 
these types of governmental overreach that had occurred at the hands of the British were not 
adopted in their new nation. Instead, the Framers believed judicial officers were more adept at 
determining whether a search was reasonable30; they favored judicial approval for specific warrants 
to determine whether there were adequate grounds for intrusion.31 
Although the right to privacy is not expressly granted by the Constitution,32 Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence encompasses an expectation of privacy. In 1890, Samuel D. Warren and 
Louis D. Brandeis wrote about the legal right to privacy, declaring the right to privacy as an 
individual’s “right of determining ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions 
shall be communicated to others.”33 Furthermore, they articulated privacy as a “right to be left 
alone.”34 
 
 
 
 
 
29Laura K. Donohue, The Original Fourth Amendment, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1181, 1198 (2016). 
30 Davies, supra note 14, at 576.  
31 DANIEL J. SOLOVE, NOTHING TO HIDE: THE FALSE TRADE OFF BETWEEN PRIVACY AND 
SECURITY, 4 (2011). 
32 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment cannot be 
translated into a general constitutional ‘right to privacy.’”). 
33 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). 
34 Id.  
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THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE AS A GENERAL WARRANT  
 
The Framer’s loathed general warrants primarily because they did not want one individual 
with arbitrary discretion to decide when someone or something would be searched, especially as it 
relates to “persons, houses, papers, and effects.”35 
 The Wilkes and Entick cases exemplify a time where the English government used general 
warrants to invade its people at its own Will.36 This behavior is similar to the third-party doctrine, as 
it allows for the exercise of broad discretion when dealing with an individual and their effects. 
Currently, the third-party doctrine enables the police and government to engage in surveillance and 
monitoring of one’s daily life, similar to the general warrant that the Fourth Amendment ultimately 
intended to prevent. The Founding Fathers would have despised this doctrine.  
In today’s digitally connected world, police only need to issue a subpoena to a third party to 
request desired data; there is no warrant requirement.37 Without a specific warrant, the government 
is conducting the very type of general searches the Fourth Amendment was adopted to prevent. Our 
constitutional guarantee to be free from arbitrary government intrusion is derived from this 
amendment. It rests on our right to be free from government surveillance unless there is probable 
cause.  
The third-party doctrine ignores the warrant requirement in the Fourth Amendment and 
allows the police to circumvent a warrant request from a judge, undermining our free society and 
creating a society that can be routinely surveilled.  
 
35 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
36 See WILLIAM J. CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ORIGINS AND ORIGINAL MEANING 43, 56-
58, 96-100, 439-40, 490-91 (2009). 
37 See Slobogin, supra note 11, at 826. 
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THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE CASE REVIEW 
  
The progression of case law can help determine whether the third-party doctrine should still 
govern access to information as technology becomes increasingly complex and common. The 
following Supreme Court cases detail the third-party doctrine progression. 
Katz is the starting point for many of the Fourth Amendment cases because this is where the 
Court established the reasonable expectation of privacy test articulated by Justice Harlan in the 
concurrence.38 Harlan’s two-part framework first asks whether an individual retained an “actual 
(subjective) expectation of privacy,” and second, whether that expectation is one that “society is 
prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.”’39 The party must satisfy both prongs to this test to claim an 
intrusion under the Fourth Amendment. The Court has since validated this framework to be 
controlling in Fourth Amendment analysis. 
In Katz, the Court held that electronically listening to and recording of the defendant’s 
words, wiretapping, in a public phone booth with the door-closed violated the defendant’s privacy 
upon which he relied.40 Because the defendant in Katz took a reasonable step to protect his privacy 
by shutting the door to the booth,41 he was likely more concerned about an “uninvited ear” than an 
“intruding eye.”42  
Prior to Katz, the Court had held that searches typically had to occur in someone’s home. 
Following Katz, physical intrusions were no longer necessary to claim a search had occurred under 
 
38 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 347 (Harlan, J., concurring).  
39 Id. at 362.  
40 Id. at 352.  
41 Id. at 354. 
42 Id. at 352. 
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the Fourth Amendment.43 In establishing this new provision, the Court reasoned that “the Fourth 
Amendment protects people, not places .... [W]hat [a person] seeks to preserve as private, even in an 
area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”44 
Miller and Smith are two of the most important Fourth Amendment cases decided by the 
Supreme Court in the 20th century. Both of these cases came before the rise of the mass digital 
information aggregation, and since these cases, there has been a surge of data collection and 
processing. In United States v. Miller, Miller was suspected of running an illegal whiskey distillery.45 
Federal agents subpoenaed his bank records, and Miller objected, claiming his bank records were his 
private papers. The Court overruled this objection, holding that because the banking information 
was shared voluntarily with banks, Miller forfeited his privacy attached to his financial records.46 
Because the information was voluntarily shared, Miller was not searched under Katz. The Court, 
appealing to the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test, noted that “[w]hat a person knowingly 
exposes to the public ... is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”47 In reaching this 
conclusion, the Court distinguished “private papers” from “business records,” finding bank records 
fit into the latter category.48 Miller suggests that when documents are voluntarily conveyed to a third 
party, regardless of the purpose of conveyance, the individual relinquishes an expectation of privacy 
in those documents.  
 A few years later, the Supreme Court decided Smith v. Maryland, holding that a warrant was 
not required before the police seized the phone number records dialed by a customer from a 
 
43 Id. at 352.  
44 Id.  
45 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 437 (1976). 
46 Id. at 435.  
47 Id. at 442.  
48 Id. at 441.  
11 
 
telephone company. 49 The Court considered that because most people at the time were aware that 
the phone company recorded the phone numbers they dialed by using the pen registers, there was 
not a legitimate expectation of privacy.50 Additionally, because the information was voluntarily 
disclosed, Smith “assumed the risk” that the telephone company might hand over the information to 
the police.51 The Court further reasoned: 
The switching equipment that processed those numbers is merely the modern 
counterpart of the operator who, in an earlier day, personally completed calls for the 
subscriber. Petitioner concedes that if he had placed his calls through an operator, he 
could claim no legitimate expectation of privacy. We are not inclined to hold that a 
different constitutional result is required because the telephone company has decided 
to automate.52 
 
In this case, the presence of technology did not alter the application of the third-party doctrine. 
The Court differentiated Smith from Katz, stating that the pen registers at issue in Smith “do not 
acquire the ‘contents’ of communications,” such as in Katz.53 Justice Stewart further clarified the 
distinction between content and non-content general records in his dissent in Smith: 
Nevertheless, the Court today says [Fourth Amendment] safeguards do not extend to 
the numbers dialed from a private telephone, apparently because when a caller dials a 
number the digits may be recorded by the telephone company for billing purposes .... 
The telephone conversation itself must be electronically transmitted by telephone 
company equipment, and may be recorded or overheard by the use of other 
company equipment. Yet we have squarely held that the user of even a public 
telephone is entitled “to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will 
not be broadcast to the world.”54 
 
49 Smith, 442 U.S. at 735.  
50 Id. at 743.  
51 Id. at 744.  
52 Id. at 744-45 (citation omitted). 
53 Id. at 741. 
54 Id. at 746-47 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 352). 
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In his dissent, Justice Stewart identified a hindrance in the application of the third-
party doctrine: that people should retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in their 
conversations regardless of where they occur.  
In 2012, the Court decided United States v. Jones. In this case, government agents installed a 
Global Positioning System (GPS) tracking device on the defendant’s vehicle without a valid 
warrant.55 Ultimately, the placement of the device constituted a “search” within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment, with the majority returning to pre-Katz doctrine, emphasizing the fact that 
because the government had physically attached the GPS device to the vehicle (an effect), the 
government had physically intruded, and therefore, a search had occurred.56  
A year later, the Court examined warrantless search and seizure of cellular telephone 
contents incident to arrest in Riley v. California.57 The Court created yet another exception to the 
Fourth Amendment when they decided that a warrant must be obtained by a judicial officer before 
law enforcement officers can search the contents of a phone.58 Although the third-party doctrine 
was not discussed at length in Riley, the opinion did demonstrate the Court’s recognition of the 
difficulties that consumers and courts face when assessing whether an individual has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy for information stored on electronic devices. The importance of Riley comes 
into play when considering if the data the government is interested in resides on the device because 
then it should receive the same Fourth Amendment protections as if the data was on a computer or 
cellphone. The Court in Riley also considered the immense storage capacity that is available on 
 
55 Jones v. United States, 565 U.S. 400, 405 (2012). 
56 Id. at 406.  
57 Riley v. United States, 573 U.S. 373, 386 (2014). 
58 Id.  
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cellphones, in that modern cellphones gather information and store that information in one place 
and that the records can give a detailed look into an individual’s life.59   
Thus, Jones is controlling when a trespass arises without a physical intrusion—such as a 
GPS—whereas Riley is controlling when searching a cell phone’s data requires a warrant. Jones and 
Riley were the Court’s first steps in addressing technology in the digital age. The recent case of 
Carpenter is a blend of these two cases, from Jones—long term tracking and from Riley—a device that 
can pinpoint location with near-perfect accuracy.  
In Carpenter v. United States, the petitioner was charged with aiding and abetting robbery that 
affected interstate commerce, after the FBI requested three orders from a magistrate judge for cell 
phone records60 under the Stored Communications Act (18 U.S.C. 27039(d)).61 This Act, enacted by 
Congress as Title II of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), set provisions 
regarding privacy expectations regarding means of electric transmission, which includes telephones 
and computers.62 With Carpenter, it gave the government access to petitioner’s cell-site location 
information (CSLI) obtained from a third-party cell-phone service provider that would otherwise be 
private information. CSLI is produced when a phone user sends or receives data, such as phone calls 
or text messages, that is then transmitted to the closest cellular tower through radio waves, thus 
producing precise records.63 These records include the date and time of transmitted data and the 
approximate location where the call began and ended based on the location to the nearest cell 
 
59 Id. at 375.  
60 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018) 
61 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, tit. II, 100 Stat. 1848, 1860-
68 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 (2015)). 
62 Id.  
63 V. Alexander Monteith, Cell Site Location Information: A Catalyst for Change in Fourth Amendment 
Jurisprudence, 27-FALL KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 82, 84 (2017).  
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tower.64 Under the Stored Communications Act, law enforcement does not need to obtain a search 
warrant from cell service providers for these records; rather, law enforcement must only obtain a 
court order by meeting reasonable suspicion standard, which is below the burden of proof of 
probable cause needed for a warrant.65 
In the case of Mr. Carpenter, the police obtained a court order that allowed them to search 
Carpenter’s cell records, pursuant to the Stored Communications Act.66 In order to receive this 
order, law enforcement showed the government that they believed the records would be relevant to 
a robbery investigation after receiving tips from one suspect who provided the accomplice’s cell 
phone number to the police.67 The government collected “12,898 location points cataloging 
Carpenter's movements,” which is “an average of 101 data points per day”68 over 127 days.69 Using 
these location points, Carpenter was placed at the scene of four robberies in question, leading to 
Carpenter’s conviction and a prison sentence of one-hundred years.70 Following the conviction, 
Carpenter appealed to the Sixth Circuit, then filed a petition for certiorari, which was granted by the 
Supreme Court.71 
The New Rule of Carpenter 
Prior third-party doctrine cases such as United States v. Miller and Smith v. Maryland left 
individuals with no legitimate fourth amendment expectation of privacy claim in information 
 
64 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2221.   
65Monteith, supra note 63, at 83.  
66 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212. 
67 Id.  
68 Id. at 2213. 
69 Id.  
70 Id. at 2212.  
71 Id. at 2213.  
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voluntarily shared with third parties.72 At first blush, because CSLI is held by carriers (a third party) 
and not customers, it appeared to fall under this doctrine, leaving U.S. citizens vulnerable to 
retrospective location-tracking and warrantless searches on behalf of the government. Chief Justice 
Roberts, in writing for the majority took a different approach. 
Chief Justice Roberts wrote, “As technology has enhanced the Government's capacity to 
encroach upon areas normally guarded against inquisitive eyes, this Court sought to “assure [] 
preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment 
was adopted.”73 He added that because “an individual maintains a legitimate expectation of privacy 
in the record of his physical movements,” the third-party doctrine does not extend to mobile 
location information.74  
Since CSLI is no more than a byproduct of owning a cellphone, the government generally 
needs a warrant to access those records, especially if the government is requesting more than seven 
days of records from the cell phone carrier.75 The police cannot collect historical CSLI from a cell 
phone service provider, according to the majority in Carpenter, due to its “depth, breadth, and 
comprehensive reach, and the inescapable and automatic nature of its collection.”76 If the depth and 
reach of the surveillance threaten “a too permeating police surveillance,” it may be justifiable to 
designate the search as an intrusive search under the Fourth Amendment.77 
 
72 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976). 
73 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2214 (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001)). 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 2235. The Court did not explain why seven days is the maximum for surveillance. 
Subsequent cases will have to weigh this cut off against privacy interests.  
76 Id. at 2223 (“In light of the deeply revealing nature of CSLI, its depth, breadth, and comprehensive 
reach, and the inescapable and automatic nature of its collection, the fact that such information is 
gathered by a third party does not make it any less deserving of Fourth Amendment protection”). 
77 Id. at 2217.  
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Due to the “world of difference between the limited types of personal information 
addressed in Smith and Miller and the exhaustive chronicle of location information casually collected 
by wireless carriers today,”78 the majority declined to extend the third-party doctrine to the 
government's request for CSLI.79 Although the Court noted that “seismic shifts in digital 
technology” has transformed the traditional third-party doctrine, Chief Justice Roberts limited the 
language of Carpenter further beyond the application of Smith and Miller, stating the decision does not 
“call into question conventional, surveillance techniques and tools, such as security cameras. Nor do 
we address other business records that might incidentally reveal location information.”80  
Rather than close this gap in legislation, the Court in Carpenter crafted a narrow exception to 
the third-party doctrine for the “unique nature of cell phone location information, requiring the 
government to obtain a warrant before compelling carriers to relinquish customer’s CSLI records.”81 
The Court made sure to emphasize that this ruling did not impact Miller and Smith.82 
This effort to limit the scope of Carpenter raises questions about the enormity of information 
that resides outside of the outdated pen registers discussed in Smith v. Maryland and the paper bank 
statements at issue in United States v. Miller. In Carpenter, “the Government can access each carrier's 
deep repository of historical location information” with “just the click of a button.”83 The Court also 
clarified that there is no distinction between the contents of cellphones and the CSLI metadata it 
 
78 Id. at 2219. 
79 Id. at 2220 (finding that CSLI “implicate[d] privacy concerns far beyond those considered in Smith 
and Miller”). 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 2217. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 2217-18.  
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generates. The availability of all this information causes concern when considering how common 
technology is in our society and the vast amount of information that is shared online.  
 Carpenter raises questions about the validity of the Katz test in a digital world, with many 
questions challenging its continued value. This is because evolving technologies transform which 
expectations of privacy are considered “reasonable,” as Justices Thomas and Gorsuch have noted.84 
At the time Miller and Smith were decided, forfeiting privacy rights on a tangible item like a pen 
register or bank documents seemed reasonable. Conveying the third-party doctrine to also apply to 
online activity where most of the data is stored in one place poses challenges. As Justice Sotomayor 
expressed in her concurrence in Jones: 
[I]t may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties. This 
approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of 
information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane 
tasks. I would not assume that all information voluntarily disclosed to some member 
of the public for a limited purpose is, for that reason alone, disentitled to Fourth 
Amendment protection.85 
 
 
Technology adds a complex layer to evaluating privacy expectations. The Court in Carpenter had a 
chance to set the record straight on exactly how the government can and should interact with 
technology. In spite of that, the rules for engagement are now even more confusing after the narrow 
ruling in Carpenter. It leaves many questions and invites relentless future arguments before the 
Supreme Court on the topics of technology and privacy. For example, open questions include 
exactly how much digital data law enforcement may possess without a warrant and when a third 
party is required to disclose its business records. While Carpenter did signal that the Fourth 
 
84 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2235-46 (Thomas, J., dissenting), 2261-72 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
85 Jones v. United States, 565 U.S. 400, 417-18 (citation omitted) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (2012). 
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Amendment may protect other types of personal information held by third parties, like records 
regarding location information, the case also raises questions about third-party files on a par with 
CSLI.86 Because there was no constitutional limit discussed in Carpenter regarding CSLI, there is no 
legal limit to restrict location surveillance by law enforcement; the impacts of Carpenter reach far 
beyond CSLI, which fails to protect privacy interests while advancing the interests of government 
spying.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
86 See infra note 89 and accompanying text.  
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VOLUNTARY CONVEYANCE AND ASSUMPTION OF RISK 
 
The crux of the Court deciding in favor of Carpenter was whether the automatic generation 
of CSLI is no more than a byproduct of having a cell-phone; cell-phones require no affirmative 
action on behalf of the user.87 In other words, as long as the phone is powered on and there is a cell 
phone tower near the phone’s location, the location is being recorded and transmitted to the third-
party cell phone carrier.  
Generally, voluntary conveyance is the premise that threatens the third-party doctrine in the 
technological era. For an action to be voluntary, it must have been intended, which presumes the 
individual knew the information would be conveyed.88 Given how omnipresent and necessary 
technology and technological disclosures are, it is nearly impossible to deem these actions as 
voluntary.  
Prior cases involving privacy have referred to this voluntary participation as an “assumption 
of risk.”89 Assumption of risk is “when a party reveals private information to another, he assumes 
the risk that his confidant will reveal that information to the authorities, and if that occurs, the 
Fourth Amendment does not prohibit governmental use of that information.”90 Under the third-
party doctrine principles of voluntary conveyance and assumption of risk, law enforcement and the 
government are entitled to investigate information disclosed to a third party businesses without a 
 
87 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2210. 
88 See Definition of Voluntary by Merriam-Webster, Merriam Webster (September 24, 2019), 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/voluntary [https://perma.cc/TXS3-A3HP] 
(“voluntary: done by design or intention: intentional”). 
89 See Smith, 442 U.S. at 745; see also Miller, 425 U.S. at 443; see also Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212. 
90 Denae Kassotis, Note, The Fourth Amendment and the Technological Exceptionalism After Carpenter: A 
Case Study on Hash-Value Matching, 29 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1243, 1275 
(citing United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117 (1984)). 
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warrant. Merely allowing a device into one’s living sphere should not be enough to void our privacy 
rights guaranteed to us since the time of this country’s founding. 
Recently, in Carpenter, the Court declined to extend the third-party doctrine to CSLI because 
voluntary exposure did not apply as carrying a cell phone has become commonplace; it was 
considered “indispensable to participation in modern society.”91 The same will be true of smart 
home devices, in addition to many of our other smart devices.  
An individual may initiate self-surveillance, for example, by buying an Amazon Echo or 
using a smartwatch; therefore, it could be construed that while using the basic functions of the 
device the individual has affirmatively engaged the device to relay a multitude of information. 
However, the individual does not intend, nor could ever imagine, the depths of the information 
these devices share, especially when this information is sent to other third parties to market products 
to consumers.92 We connect to technology to establish and maintain relationships and function in 
society. We voluntarily disclose detailed information about our private lives, such as information 
about our religious views or sexual preferences, to social media platforms, such as Facebook, 
Twitter, and LinkedIn so we can participate in digital social life. Many of these third-party service 
providers or social media platforms ask users to click “I Agree” after a long terms of service 
agreement or privacy disclosure agreement. However, the average person does not have time to read 
this lengthy document, and nor can they understand the complicated legalese that the agreement 
often contains. Or, if he can understand the complicated legalese, he fails to understand the 
ramifications of sharing the information or even the depths of information stored on him. 
 
91 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220. 
92 See e.g. Stacy-Ann Elvy, Commodifying Consumer Data in the Era of the Internet of Things, 59 B.C. L. REV. 
423 (2018). 
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THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE IMPACT ON TECHNOLOGIES 
 
Self-cyber-surveillance is the “intentional or consensual creation of mass information about 
oneself through electronic tracking or other means.”93 This self-cyber-surveillance has changed the 
daily lives of many individuals, including how private their information is. Assistive technologies 
present an issue in the accumulation of data retained by third-party businesses.94 This data creation 
and collection is described loosely as the Internet Of Things, or IoT.95 IoT is defined as the 
“aggregation of systems of networks connected by the Internet or other radio-type device,” which 
“creates consensual mass self-surveillance.”96 Because this includes any device with an on/off switch 
to the Internet, a host of devices are included that seamlessly share information to “improve 
consumer, commercial, health, and other needs.”97 The records aggregated from these devices could 
be either metadata or content, or a mix of both. Examples of these devices include medicine 
dispensers that remind individuals to take their medicine,98 thermostats that allow individuals to 
adjust their preferred settings from a smartphone,99 or even a trashcan that “scans the barcodes of 
discarded products, automatically adds them to a smartphone's shopping list, and sends a text when 
 
93 Steven I. Friedland, Drinking from the Fire Hose: How Massive Self-Surveillance from the Internet of Things is 
Changing the Face of Privacy, 119 W. VA. L. REV. 891, 892 (2017). 
94 The issue raised is only when the data resides in the cloud or in the hands of a third-party service 
provider. If there is data that is housed in the device, it is protected under Riley.  
95 Friedland, supra note 93, at 892.  
96 Id.  
97 Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Internet of Things and the Fourth Amendment of Effects, 104 CALIF. L. 
REV. 805, 814 (2016). 
98 Paul Kominers, Interoperability Case Study, Internet of Things (IoT), Berkman Ctr. for Internet & Soc'y 
(Apr. 16 2012), https://cyber.law.harvard.edu/node/97248 [https://perma.cc/VG3W-4DER]. 
99 How Home/Away Assist Uses Your Phone's Location, Nest, 
https://support.google.com/googlenest/answer/9262475?hl=en (last visited November 1, 2019). 
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the trashcan is full.”100 This also includes in-home technologies, such as the Amazon Echo and 
biometric data found on Apple Watches and FitBit Devices. The information shared with these 
devices can also be shared with other devices and applications. Many of these devices already work 
off the same passive data collection that smartphones do; similarly, the signals from the devices 
make them communication devices. Thus, they are synonymous and should be protected with the 
reasoning behind CSLI in Carpenter.101 
The aggregation of smart technology data also allows the government to work with 
corporations to create detailed reports of unsuspecting individuals who may have committed 
crimes.102  Since Carpenter’s narrow decision regarding CSLI, the third-party doctrine remains 
relatively undisturbed. However, more information will continue to be shared with third-party 
service providers, especially with the advent of new technology. This allows for the disjunction 
between our constitutional protections and technology surveillance and allows the gap between the 
two to become progressively more pronounced. In fact, the fear of government surveillance is not 
speculative; the government has requested data in the past, notably, to solve crimes, but it would not 
be far-out to imagine this data being used in nefarious ways.  
 
 
 
 
100 Ryan G. Bishop, Note, The Walls Have Ears, And Eyes, And Noses: Home Smart Devices and the Fourth 
Amendment, 61 ARIZ. L. REV. 667, 668 (2019). 
101 Christopher Mims, All Ears: Always-On Listening Devices Could Soon Be Everywhere, WALL STREET J. 
(July 12, 2018, 12:00 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/all-ears-always-on-listening-devices-could-
soon-be-everywhere-1531411250.  
102 See Trevor Timm, The Government Just Admitted it Will Use Smart Home Devices for Spying, GUARDIAN 
(February 9, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/feb/09/internet-of-things-
smart-devices-spying-surveillance-us-government/. 
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A. Smart-Home Devices 
Smart-home devices “connect the devices and appliances in your home so that they can 
communicate with each other and with you.”103 These devices are a natural progression of the 
Internet of Things. Accordingly, a smart-home is defined by appliances or devices that are capable 
of connecting with one another through phone applications and the internet. 
The Amazon Echo is a smart-home device that can respond to voice queries about the weather, 
turn down the lights or the temperature, or even order the groceries.104 Alexa, Amazon’s voice-
activated digital assistant powers Echo devices.105 For the Echo to respond to the owner’s request, 
she listens for the device wake word, “Alexa.”106 Meanwhile, the Echo “records your voice and 
transfers it to a processor for analysis”; the recordings are streamed and stored remotely in the cloud 
and can be reviewed at a later date.107 The preferences expressed by individuals to their smart home 
devices are used to create a comprehensive profile, which is shared by third parties, based on the 
specific consumer’s activities, including his daily activities (through the calendar applications) or his 
health profile (through health monitoring applications).  
 
103 Molly Edwards & Nathan Chandler, HowStuffWorks.com, How Smart Homes Work, 
http://home.howstuffworks.com/smart-home1.htm (last visited October 25, 2019). 
104 Brief for Technology Companies as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 9, Carpenter v. 
United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (No. 16-402). 
105 Anne Pfeifle, Alexa, What Should We Do About Privacy? Protecting Privacy for Users of Voice-Activated 
Devices, 93 WASH. L. REV. 421, 422. (2018) (citing Robert Hackett, Amazon Echo's Alexa Went 
Dollhouse Crazy, FORTUNE (Jan. 9, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/01/09/amazon-echo-alexa-
dollhouse/. 
106 Id. at 421-22. (citing Robert Hackett, Amazon Echo's Alexa Went Dollhouse Crazy, FORTUNE (Jan. 9, 
2017), http://fortune.com/2017/01/09/amazon-echo-alexa-dollhouse/  
107 Eliott C. McLaughlin, Suspect OKs Amazon to hand over Echo recordings in murder case , CNN 
BUSINESS (April 26, 2017, 2:52 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/03/07/tech/amazon-echo-alexa-
bentonville-arkansas-murder-case/index.html.  
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A specific example occurred in a widely publicized 2015 case where it was alleged an 
Amazon Echo picked up the audio of a man, James Bates, murdering his wife in his home.108 
Although Mr. Bates voluntarily consented to the release of records held by Amazon, this is a 
cautionary tale of the information the Amazon Echo retains and is later available information that 
the government can seize under the third-party doctrine. These records contain some of our 
innermost thoughts, including details about our familial, professional, and religious and political ties.  
On the one hand, because the Echo users voluntarily convey this information to third 
parties, there are no Fourth Amendment protections involved. In contrast, Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence has rendered the Home supreme.109 In fact, Justice Scalia stood firm that the core idea 
of the Fourth Amendment is the right to be free from reasonable government intrusion, which 
should include an individual’s right to retreat into his own home.110 Furthermore, Riley concerns are 
implicated due to the capabilities of these smart home devices. The home has been considered a 
sacred place since the Framers and following through the Fourth Amendment history. However, 
IoT has grown, mostly unregulated, and it is threatening the sanctity of the home. If the police were 
to physically enter your house and seize your IoT device, later downloading the data, you would 
have a trespass to your property or effects, and therefore a violation of your privacy. This concept 
becomes hazy when discussing an interception of your data on the device. This is because, since the 
Echo is always listening, the device serves as a covert listening device, or—informally—"a bug,” or 
 
108 Id.  
109See Donohue, supra note 29, at 1188. See also United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984) (“At 
the risk of belaboring the obvious, private residences are places in which the individual normally 
expects privacy free of governmental intrusion not authorized by a warrant, and that expectation is 
plainly one that society is prepared to recognize as justifiable.”). 
110 Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 13 (2013) (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 
(1961)). See also Justice Scalia’s reasoning in Kyllo, ““in the home ... all details are intimate details.” 
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 at 37 (2001). 
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wiretap. While a user can delete the records that Alexa creates (although it is unclear how much of 
the records are deleted from the cache of information), it is strongly discouraged because the loss of 
records impairs the performance of the device.111 Compelling individuals to give up their privacy 
rights to their information stored by third parties for the sake of convenience is not reasonable nor 
acceptable.  
When an individual acquires a new device, he is most likely not rushing home to read the 
privacy policy. Rather, he rushes home to install the new piece of technology and start using it. This 
hastiness almost always results in the user giving up their data in exchange for the use of the new 
device. For example, in 2015, Samsung was in the news for a privacy policy related to the use of 
their Smart TV’s.112 The company had initially cautioned customers that, through the use of voice 
recognition, data would be transmitted to third parties.113 It did not take long for consumers and 
news outlets to begin reporting on the issue, comparing the Samsung Smart TV to the telescreens 
featured in George Orwell’s 1984.114 Following the backlash, Samsung changed the Smart TV 
privacy policy to state explicitly how Voice Recognition worked. The new policy is as follows: 
If you enable Voice Recognition, you can interact with your Smart TV using your 
voice. To provide the Voice Recognition feature, your voice commands will be 
transmitted (along with information about your device, including device identifiers) 
to us and we will convert your voice commands into text to provide the Voice 
Recognition features. In addition, Samsung may collect voice commands and 
associated texts so that we can evaluate and improve the features. Samsung will 
collect your voice commands when you make a specific request to the Smart TV by 
 
111 Jing Cao & Dina Bass, Why Google, Microsoft, and Amazon Love the Sound of Your Voice, BLOOMBERG 
TECH. (Dec. 13, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-12-13/why-google-
microsoft-and-amazon-love-the-sound-of-your-voice [https://perma.cc/5DW7-ATQ8]. 
112 See, e.g., Andrew Griffin, Samsung smart TV policy allows company to listen in on users, INDEPENDENT 
(Feb. 9, 2015), http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/samsungs-new-
smart-tv-policy-allows-company-to-listen-in-on-users-10033012.html. 
113 Natasha Lomas, Samsung Edits Orwellian Clause Out of TV Privacy Policy, TECH CRUNCH (Feb. 10, 
2015), http://techcrunch.com/2015/02/10/smarttv-privacy/#.puzvmzo:yfMB. 
114 Id.  
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clicking the activation button either on the remote control or on your screen or by 
speaking a wake word…and speaking into the microphone on the remote control or 
Smart TV.115 
 
Samsung also clarified that individuals could opt-out of voice recognition if they had privacy 
concerns, but the capabilities would be impacted.  
B. Biometric Technology 
FitBit devices, a computing watch designed to track physical activity, raise additional 
concerns. Typically, the FitBit monitors blood pressure, gives a sleep assessment, and counts steps, 
which is intended for consumers to gauge their personal health better.116 This device also logs 
location information, uploading this information to a computer or mobile device if it is within range 
of a wireless internet source.117  
This biometric data involves private information that, without the device, the individual 
otherwise most likely would not have; this information is extraordinarily intimate. However, this 
information can be “accessed, aggregated--even anonymized--and sorted by health companies or 
insurers to predict health trends and create more efficiencies in their businesses,” which could pique 
the interest of other third parties and the government.118 Anonymity may not be enough, though, to 
ensure our privacy is protected. In fact, according to one researcher, “[t] he way we move . . . is so 
unique that four points [of location information] are enough to identify 95% of people.”119 
 
115Samsung Privacy Policy--SmartTV Supplement, Samsung, 
http://www.samsung.com/sg/info/privacy/smarttv.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2019). 
116 Twomey, supra note 5, at 419. 
117 Help Article: How do I get data from my tracker to the website?, fitbit help, 
http://help.fitbit.com/articles/en_US/Help_article/How-do-I-get-data-from-my-tracker-to-the-
website/?l=en_US&fs=RelatedArticle (last updated Aug. 13, 2019). 
118 Friedland, supra note 93, at 897.  
119 Jason Palmer, Mobile Location Data ‘Present Anonymity Risk,’ BBC NEWS (Mar. 25, 2013), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-21923360. 
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The technology behind Fit Bit devices is advanced enough that Fit Bits can track physical 
exertion consistent with violent acts120 or monitor an elevated blood pressure under the influence of 
drugs.121 
This newfound way of continued attachment to the digital world begs one major question: 
Would the information gathered, likely voluntarily, through various sources be a business record, 
thereby requiring third-party services to turn over the information on their customers? 
C. Internet Tracking 
 It is unclear whether Carpenter applies consistently to all forms of location data, specifically 
geotags which are embedded in a digital photograph that describes the time, date, and GPS 
coordinates of where the photo was taken and where the individual logged on to the social media 
site if the photograph was posted.122 They are similar to CSLI because they are automatically 
collected without affirmative action by the user. However, it is different because posting a picture on 
a public social media site is an affirmative action in which the user acknowledges that an 
indiscriminate group of people could see the post. This is what happened to millionaire John 
McAfee, founder of McAfee Security Software Company.123 McAfee was wanted by law 
enforcement in connection with a crime, and although he threw out some taunts, authorities could 
 
120 Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The “Smart” Fourth Amendment, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 547, 561 (2017) 
(citing Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps Toward Managing Discrimination, Privacy, 
Security, and Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85, 93 (2014)).  
121 Id. (See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Internet of Things and the Fourth Amendment of Effects 104 
CALIF. L. REV. 805, 809-11, 825 (2016).       
122 Definition - What does Geotagging mean?, https://www.techopedia.com/definition/86/geotagging 
(last visited Nov. 1, 2019). 
123 Craig Timberg, Hacker Locates John McAfee through Smartphone Tracks, The Washington Post (Dec. 4, 
2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/hacker-locates-john-mcafee-through-
smartphone-tracks/2012/12/04/55a498d8-3e4a-11e2-bca3-aadc9b7e29c5_story.html. 
28 
 
not catch him, until a journalist took a photo with McAfee and uploaded it online.124 This photo had 
been routinely geotagged, leading a computer hacker to MacAfee’s exact location in a Guatemalan 
village.125 While this case was a win for the police, this case should resonate with the average person. 
It was not difficult for this computer hacker to collect this information, even after MacAfee believed 
he had taken steps to conceal his location. Hackers with bad intentions could have received this 
geotagged location and took care of MacAfee, or in the case MacAfee had not been accused of 
anything, the police could have reviewed it for evidence. 
 The government also has access to many of our routine activities. As Eleventh Circuit Judge 
Beverly Martin expressed: 
Nearly every website collects information about what we do when we 
visit…the Fourth Amendment allows the government to know from YouTube.com 
what we watch, or Facebook.com what we post or whom we “friend,” or 
Amazon.com what we buy, or Wikipedia.com what we research, or Match.com 
whom we date—all without a warrant. In fact, the government could ask “cloud”-
based file-sharing services like Dropbox or Apple's iCloud for all the files we 
relinquish to their servers. I am convinced that most internet users would be shocked 
by this.126 
 
We leave a digital footprint anytime we interact with devices that connect to the internet. 
Paul Ohm, professor at Georgetown Law Center and privacy advocate, testified to Congress 
with respect to the trove of data collected by sources: 
The list of websites an individual visits, available to a [broadband Internet access 
service] provider even when https encryption is used, reveals so much more than a 
member of a prior generation would have revealed in a composite list of every book 
she had checked out, every newspaper and magazine she had subscribed to, every 
theater she had visited, every television channel she had clicked to, and every 
bulletin, leaflet, and handout she had read. No power in the technological history of 
our nation has been able until now to watch us read individual articles, calculate how 
 
124 Id.  
125 Id.  
126 United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 536 (11th Cir. 2015) (Martin, J., dissenting). 
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long we linger on a given page, and reconstruct the entire intellectual history of what 
we read and watch on a minute-by-minute, individual-by-individual basis.127 
 
Our web browsing records allow the government an unprecedented amount of information, and a 
staggering amount is left unprotected. For instance, individuals share information about themselves 
simply by surfing the web because of the tracking methods websites use to store information.128 One 
way websites track us is through cookies, which are small pieces of code sent back to the company 
that details “whether you are a returning user, the sites you visited before, and after visiting their 
web site, the items you view on a web site, and sometimes even the information you enter into the 
computer while on the web site.”129 
D. Storage in the Cloud 
In today’s era, much of our private data is held in the “cloud,” which is defined as a 
“combination of structured, semistructured, and unstructured data collected by organizations that 
can be mined for information and used in…advanced analytics applications.”130 Essentially, the user 
“rents space” on a trusted server.131 They may do this either because their computer cannot store 
enough on its hard-drive, for additional protection should a file be wiped off their computer, or 
both. Many users find cloud storage extremely convenient, largely because the cloud can be accessed 
 
127 FCC Overreach: Examining the Proposed Privacy Rules: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Commc'n & 
Tech. of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 114th Cong. 5 (2016) (statement of Paul Ohm, Professor, 
Georgetown University Law Center). 
128 Derek S. Witte, Bleeding Data in a Pool of Sharks: The Anathema of Privacy in a World of Digital Sharing 
and Electronic Discovery, 64 S.C. L. REV. 717, 731 (2013).  
129 Id.  
130 Margaret Rouse, Big Data, Tech Target: AI in IT Tools Promises Better, Faster, Stronger Ops (last visited 
October 31, 2019), https://searchdatamanagement.techtarget.com/definition/big-data. 
131 Erik C. Shallman, Comment, Up in the Air: Clarifying Cloud Storage Protections, 19 INTELL. PROP. 
L. BULL. 49, 54 (2014). 
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remotely. Nevertheless, cloud storage is problematic because it requires users to give their data to a 
third-party service provider who will then store this vast quantity of information.  
Apple’s iCloud Privacy Policy relating to cloud storage and law enforcement provides: 
You acknowledge and agree that Apple may, without liability to you, access, use, 
preserve and/or disclose your Account information and Content to law enforcement 
authorities, government officials, and/or a third party, as Apple believes is reasonably 
necessary or appropriate, if legally required to do so or if Apple has a good faith belief 
that such access, use, disclosure, or preservation is reasonably necessary to: (a) comply 
with legal process or request; (b) enforce this Agreement, including investigation of any 
potential violation thereof; (c) detect, prevent or otherwise address security, fraud or 
technical issues; or (d) protect the rights, property or safety of Apple, its users, a third 
party, or the public as required or permitted by law.132 
 
This privacy policy affords very little protection to consumers’ data once the data is transferred to 
the Apple iCloud. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
132 iCloud Terms and Conditions, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/legal/internet-
services/icloud/en/terms.html (last revised Sept.19, 2019). 
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THE FUTURE OF THE CLOUD 
 
The Stored Communications Act (SCA) that is part of the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act (ECPA) was an act created to regulate electronic communications.133 However, it 
reflects the technology of the 1960s, thereby rendering it nearly ineffective to support privacy 
intrusions from the government on third-party servers that store and process the data that emanates 
from our modern devices.134 
At the time of the SCA’s enactment, “digital information still resided in large data centers” 
and “the data stored in data centers were not readily transportable.”135 Because we, and companies, 
store our data everywhere, the question becomes how we should interpret the SCA in the digital age. 
According to the SCA, a warrant is not required if the data has been stored for more than 180 
days.136 This stipulation made sense during this time, as the online storage of data in the cloud was 
extremely costly, and the Internet of Things had not begun to ubiquitously aggregate data as it does 
now. Privacy expectations should not diminish merely because 180 days has elapsed, just as privacy 
expectations do not diminish solely because time has passed. 
This outdated language leads to another problem. The SCA defines electronic storage “both 
as ‘any temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic communication incidental to the 
electronic transmission thereof’ and ‘any storage of such communication by an electronic 
communication service for purposes of backup protection of such communication.’”137 Privacy 
 
133 Witte, supra note 128, at 748. 
134 Mark Wilson, Comment, Castle in the Cloud: Modernizing Constitutional Protections for Cloud-Stored Data 
on Mobile Devices, 43 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 261, 263 (2013); Witte, supra note 128, at 748. 
135 Wilson, supra note 134, at 263. 
136 18 U.S.C.A. § 2703(a) (Westlaw 2012). 
137 Wilson, supra note 134, at 277 (citing 18 U.S.C.A. § 2510(17) (Westlaw 2012). 
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protections hinge in these crucial distinctions, but this second definition will cause problems with 
the popularity of the cloud, as the language of the statute excludes much of the currently stored 
data.138 It also does not account for how quickly and easily information can be accessed by a third 
party, which traditionally might have been stored on a computer’s hard drive or in a file cabinet. The 
immense information stored on a Cloud should be afforded greater protections than are currently 
provided. For example, much of the information stored through the third-party service Dropbox, 
which is a well-known cloud service provider, should be covered under the SCA.139 
Essentially, the files in these servers are “papers” in modern electronic communications, 
leaving cloud storage as an extension of Fourth Amendment protection if one acknowledges the 
modern-day technological equivalence of physical storage. In fact, the cloud is merely an illusion, as 
information is stored on a physical server rather than a far-off intangible place, as the name would 
suggest.140 The significant difference is that physical limitations found in traditional Fourth 
Amendment cases with a physical intrusion are no longer commonplace in the digital age. In relation 
to the third-party doctrine, it remains unclear if cloud data is a business record.141 
Cloud storage should be an extension of Fourth Amendment protection if one 
acknowledges the modern-day equivalence of storage. The significant difference is that physical 
limitations found in traditional Fourth Amendment cases with a physical intrusion are no longer 
commonplace in the digital age.  
 
138 Shallman, supra note 131, at 67.  
139 Id. at 50. Dropbox is a remote file-storage application that automatically syncs digital files to its 
servers upon the user’s action. 
140 Wei Chen Lin, Where Are Your Papers?: The Fourth Amendment, The Stored Communications Act, The 
Third-Party Doctrine, The Cloud, and Encryption, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 1093, 1107 (2016). 
141 See Erik C. Shallman, Comment, Up in the Air: Clarifying Cloud Storage Protections, 19 INTELL. 
PROP. L. BULL. 49 (2014). 
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DISCUSSION OF CURRENT PRIVACY THEORIES 
 
It is imperative the Supreme Court establishes a new precedent for government access to 
third party records. These theories will only be described insofar as they relate to technology.  
A. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Test 
Four decades have passed since Justice Harlan opined the reasonable expectation of privacy 
test in his Katz v. United States concurrence, and the meaning of the phrase is still cloudy. However, it 
remains the cornerstone of many of the protected privacy rights cases.  
The reasonable expectation of privacy test is subjective and outdated. This test assumes that 
judges can effectively assess what a “reasonable” person would expect; however, there are two issues 
that arise from this test. First, by assuming a judge can discern what a reasonable person might feel 
about a specific type of technology, we also assume that the judge is up to date on all of the 
technologies many people use on a daily basis. Additionally, it does not leave room for reasonable 
individuals to have a differing opinion on what they see as, in this case, a reasonable intrusion of 
privacy. Put simply, in a society that normalizes comprehensive surveillance, how “reasonable” are 
the average people, and who is the society? Does the average person’s opinion come from the 
majority of people through a poll or survey? If so, this binds the minority thinkers to the preferences 
of the majority, thus ignoring the goal of the Bill of Rights in the Constitution of limiting the will of 
the majority.142 The second issue is the outdated context of the test. It requires judges to consider 
new technology and then create policy based on how they perceive Americans might understand the 
latest technology and how the technology in question works.  
 
142 SOLOVE, supra note 31, at 117. 
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As it is currently understood, the expectation of privacy test is often the dominant theory 
cited when questioning Fourth Amendment protections.  
B. Property/Trespass Theory 
Physical intrusions, regardless of how major or minor the interference, can generate a Fourth 
Amendment violation under the trespass theory.143 “The property-based approach emphasizes the 
historical reverence of property rights in the colonial era leading up to the American Revolution.”144 
This approach was frequently used up until the 1960s before the Katz balancing test replaced it, and 
it required individuals to prove that the government had physically trespassed into their property 
before Fourth Amendment relief could be considered.145 
In 2012, Jones v. United States dusted off the old trespass doctrine when the court decided that 
a GPS attachment to a car used to monitor the vehicle's movement was a physical trespass.146 In 
writing for the majority, Justice Scalia stressed the physical aspect of the search, reasoning that the 
Government had intruded on the defendant’s privacy when they “inserted [an] information 
gathering device.”147 However, the majority did not disturb the long-held privacy formulation 
defined in Katz, signaling an era in which Fourth Amendment protections were subjective based on 
the type of trespass that occurred. .148 Justice Scalia most likely chose the property approach over the 
 
143 See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 at 402 (2012) (holding that placement of the GPS device 
without any other intrusion was a search). 
144 Bishop, supra note 100, at 673.  
145 Brady, supra note 18, at 949. See also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352-53 (1967) (rejecting 
the notion that physical penetration into a protected area is required to show a Fourth Amendment 
search).  
146 Jones, 565 U.S. at 405, 410. 
147 Id. at 410. 
148 Id. at 411.  
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reasonable expectation of privacy test established in Katz because it was more straight-forward than 
the Katz test. 
C. Mosaic Theory 
Privacy activist Orin Kerr explains the Mosaic Theory as an “aggregated set of data 
acquisitions,” noting that a set of non-searches can amount to a search because the collection of the 
data and following analysis creates a revealing mosaic of a person’s private life.149 It is the 
aggregation of these movements, regardless of whether the movements occurred in the public view, 
that is worthy of protection. A mosaic search might bring together locations and timeframes that 
illustrate a comprehensive picture of a suspect’s life. The main issue with the Mosaic Theory that 
draws a parallel to the issues with the current reasonable expectation of privacy is the subjective 
nature of a violation. The quality of the mosaic will be different for each person, especially when 
considering the different kinds of surveillance tools, which then raises its own reasonableness 
concerns.150  Courts will then be forced to determine a framework for deciding how much 
information, or what kind of information can be gathered before it is a “search.”  
D. Positive Law Theory 
When courts apply the positive law model, they are considering whether there is a law (or 
statute, rule, code), other than the Fourth Amendment, that restricts the government’s invasion.151 
Positive law questions whether a search or seizure occurs by determining whether a private party 
could lawfully conduct the action the government engaged in.152 Accordingly, instead of the court 
being concerned about a “reasonable search,” the court would ask whether in completing the search 
 
149 Id. at 321.  
150 Id. at 329.  
151 Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503, 516 (2007). 
152 Richard M. Re, The Positive Law Floor, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 313, 314 (2016). 
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if the government official violated “general applicable law or avail themselves of a governmental 
exemption from it.”153 
Positive law may be problematic when new technologies arise because the cornerstone of 
this theory relies on existing law. The rate at which technology changes and adapts will make it 
nearly impossible for legislators to keep up with regulating emerging technologies, and even if they 
try, a backlog may result due to ever-changing technology. It is also possible that some kinds of 
technology are so obscure that any sort of law regulating its use would be ill-advised.154 Another 
roadblock keeping this theory from becoming a guiding precedent is technologies that only the 
government has access to. It could be possible for lawmakers to tweak the laws to allow private 
properties access to the technology to avoid Fourth Amendment scrutiny, fully knowing the private 
party will never have access to the device.155 
E. Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory 
Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory is defined by privacy scholar Orin Kerr as the idea that the 
courts adjust “legal rules to restore the preexisting balance of police power.”156 Under this theory, if 
a case arises, the judge would adjust the level of protection for new technology to maintain this 
balance of power.157 Kerr argues that the courts should decide this protection to restore a time in 
 
153 William Baude & James Y. Stern, The Positive Law Model of the Fourth Amendment, 129 HARV. L. 
REV. 1821, 1826 (2016). 
154 See Kyllo v. United States where the Court held that if the government used a device to complete a 
search that is not available to the general public, the search is unreasonable and requires a warrant. 
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 36 (2001). Although you may now buy the device used in 
question in Kyllo, it is not hard to convey this same holding to other devices not yet available to the 
public.  
155 Baude, supra note 153, at 326.  
156 Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 476, 482 
(2011). 
157 Id. at 501.  
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which he calls “Year Zero.”158 Year Zero is a fictional time that is used as a basis to discern how the 
“introduction of new tools poses a constant challenge to any legal system that seeks to regulate 
police investigations.”159 
It considers the dynamic nature of technology and social change,160and realizes that new 
tools and attitudes threaten the security and privacy balance between criminals and police because 
they allow both sides to “accomplish tasks they could not before” or do those tasks “more easily and 
cheaper than before.”161 The police should not have so much power that they infringe on an 
individual’s civil liberties, but they also must be powerful enough to enforce the law.162 This theory is 
more about maintaining the status quo of power, rather than an effort to restore the Amendment to 
the Founder’s original intent. 
This theory exacerbates the Fourth Amendment privacy judicial delay problem that the 
courts already face. Kerr argues this delay would be encouraged to ensure the courts do not make 
decisions too soon about technology.163 However, this delay would only complicate decisions due to 
the difficult to predict and progressive nature of IoT. This theory also requires judges to project 
their opinion on various technology cases. 
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THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE AFTER CARPENTER 
 
Carpenter could have been used for fundamental change to the third-party doctrine, but due 
to the narrow ruling in the case, concerns and questions about what kinds of digital data and how 
much data the government may access without a warrant will likely continue to arise in lower courts 
and possibly become future certiorari petitions. Carpenter does, however, provide a roadmap for 
future decisions as it disfavored the government’s ability to claim, “a significant extension of [the 
third-party doctrine] to a distinct category of information.”164 The Court acknowledged that in order 
to live in modern society, the use of smart technologies is always encouraged and sometimes 
required. 
The online vendor where I occasionally order products analyzes my buying preferences to 
suggest future, related purchases. There is an electronic trail of when I send emails and to whom 
they are sent. My favorite search engine collects my inquiries and stores them in case I need to 
revisit an old search. The news application on my phone filters stories and suggests new ones based 
on what I have been interested in in the past. I can monitor my home security cameras from my cell 
phone and lock the doors and windows to my house from my smartphone.  
Professor Daniel Solove, an expert in the privacy field, considered the third-party doctrine to 
be “one of the most serious threats to privacy in the digital age.”165 The abandonment of the third-
party doctrine should be favored and replaced with an approach that is neutral regardless of the type 
of technology to eliminate uncertainty and confusion over whether society has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the presence of certain technologies. In theory, a new approach should also 
 
164 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219 (2018). 
165 Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Codification and Professor Kerr's Misguided Call for Judicial Deference, 
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allow the market to create new technologies and help them to fully understand the privacy 
implications of the devices they purchase so they can make an informed decision about their use of 
the device. A new theory should also preclude the need to prosecute the privacy concerns over every 
new application or device or company that maintains records about us.  
As Justice Gorsuch explained in his dissent in Carpenter, the third-party doctrine is woefully 
incapable of reconciling Fourth Amendment protections in the modern age, stating “[e]ven our 
most private documents--those that, in other eras, we would have locked safely in a desk drawer or 
destroyed--now reside on third-party servers.”166  
 The third-party doctrine should not apply because much of the information forfeited by 
individuals is completed on behalf of their devices. To waive Fourth Amendment protections, the 
information given to a third-party must be voluntary on the part of the individual. However, many 
device users do not voluntarily give up information; rather, when the devices are powered on, 
information is sent on behalf of the individual to third parties. No voluntary action triggers this 
collection, and warrantless government searches conducted on the authority of the third-party 
doctrine should be unconstitutional. Because this is like the reasoning in Carpenter, this data 
collection should be given the same protections as CSLI.167  
 It is estimated that by 2025, 55 billion IoT devices will be in use, up from 9 billion in 2017.168 
This rapid expansion highlights the importance of establishing protection for data held by third 
parties, rather than just protecting CSLI. 
 
166 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2262 (Gorsuch, J, dissenting). 
167 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.  
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REVISITING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN THE DIGITAL AGE 
 
A comprehensive awareness of the text and history of the Fourth Amendment and an 
understanding of modern technology is required for deciding privacy cases in the digital age. The 
understanding of what areas are constitutionally protected has grown to reflect changes in society 
and technology, with even originalist, conservative judges willing to expand protections to cover 
modern technologies.169 In his dissenting opinion in Carpenter, Judge Gorsuch explained the 
importance of preserving the privacy that was intended since the adoption of the Fourth 
Amendment, further stating that the Fourth Amendment must protect “specific rights known at the 
founding” and also their “modern analogues.”170  
The modern definitions of “papers” and “effects” are very complex compared to what the 
Framers had at the time of the Fourth Amendment. However, through the jurisprudence of the 
Fourth Amendment, they essentially provide the same purpose; emails are modern letters171 , and 
computers are like file cabinets.172 The computers and software that store our digital footprint hold 
enormous amounts of data that could equal the massive amounts of data of the “papers” and 
“effects” the Founders envisioned. Professor Davies, a well-known privacy scholar, has stated: 
In sum, although the evidence on this point is less than definitive, the available 
linguistic and statutory evidence suggests that “persons, houses, papers, and effects” 
was understood to provide clear protection for houses, personal papers, the sorts of 
domestic and personal items associated with houses, and even commercial products 
 
169 For example, Justice Scalia recognized in Kyllo, “While the technology used in the present case 
was relatively crude, the rule we adopt must take account of more sophisticated systems that are 
already in use or in development” Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 36 (2001). 
170 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2271 (Gorsuch, J, dissenting). 
171 See, e.g., United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 284 (6th Cir. 2010). 
172 See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 592 F.3d 511 (4th Cir. 2010) (“At bottom, we conclude that the 
sheer amount of information contained on a computer does not distinguish the authorized search of 
the computer from an analogous search of a file cabinet containing a large number of documents.”). 
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or goods that might be stored in houses--while leaving commercial premises and 
interests otherwise subject to congressional discretion.173 
 
The text of the Fourth Amendment expresses the “right to be secure” in one’s person, house, 
papers, and effects; the Framers intended to preserve that liberty against undue infringement, 
specifically state intrusion, by government officers regardless of inevitable shifting cultural norms. 
Old-fashioned deposit receipts have been replaced by a digital paper.174 When cars pass through a 
toll booth, an electronic record is created that logs the location and time of the passing.175 All the 
files the Framers might have had in their desks are now available in digital format located on a 
computer.176 Because of the history and purpose of the Fourth Amendment, “papers” should be 
read as an expressive analog to the more conventional, physical papers. This reading allows us to 
retain our guaranteed constitutional rights while also recognizing the role of technology and how it 
has altered the world. It is also necessary for this framework to work along a continuum. 
Information that is freely shared with others, for example, revealing comments left on public social 
media pages, deserves little to no protection.177 Data that the user takes a concerted effort to restrict 
access to, data that contains deeply revealing information, or data that would typically be covered 
under the Fourth Amendment should be protected. This is due to the large amount of information 
that is held by third parties that if shared, would threaten to expose some of our innermost thoughts 
 
173 Davies, supra note 14 at 714. Various courts have interpreted Fourth Amendment “effects” to 
cover personal property, possessions, or objects. 
174 Ferguson, supra note 120, at 598.  
175 Id.  
176 Id. at 598-99.  
177 Most data collected by smart devices will not be in “plain view” as it has been commonly 
understood. However, information that is readily shared with information online through a public 
forum, with no additional skills or information required to achieve this information, will be an 
exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.  
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and questions, even bordering on characteristics that one would only share with their private diary or 
journal. 
Under the existing doctrine, a gap exists in how to classify an “effect.” The term “effect” has 
long been understood as an extension to personal property; in fact, the Court has referenced objects 
such as automobiles178 and luggage179 as “effects” throughout its history. Many scholars have 
suggested a broader reading of “effects” due to the digital age to cover computers, telephones, and 
other storage devices.180 There is no reason why “effects” cannot be updated to be consistent with 
Fourth Amendment principles, as it would include the smart data, as well as signals emanating from 
the device. 
The Internet of Things offers new surveillance possibilities that do not require physical 
intrusion, resulting in the possibility for increased government surveillance than can reveal daily 
routines.  
The Fourth Amendment was not intended to define privacy, rather like the rest of the 
Constitution, it is meant to recognize the necessity of limiting the government’s power and 
discretion. Despite new breakouts of technology, it is crucial that the Fourth Amendment is 
 
178 See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439 (1973) (“Although vehicles are ‘effects' within the 
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reevaluated to provide for traditional privacy limits because with current interpretations, the Fourth 
Amendment is ineffective against government intervention. 
A. Technology or Privacy: Do you have to choose just one? 
Often, many people explain away their privacy by stating they have “got nothing to hide,” 
and because they are not doing anything wrong, they need not worry about the government having 
access to their information.181 These explanations are known, respectively, as Nothing to Hide and 
All-or-Nothing. 
Nothing to Hide 
When discussing data privacy and technology, many people respond with they have nothing 
to hide. Variations of this argument include: 
• If you have nothing to hide, you have nothing to fear.182 
• “Like I said, I have nothing to hide. The majority of the American people have 
nothing to hide. And those that have something to hide should be found out, and get 
what they have coming to them”183 
• “Do I care if the FBI monitors my phone calls?  I have nothing to hide.  Neither 
does 99.99 percent of the population.  If the wiretapping stops one of these Sept. 11 
incidents, thousands of lives are saved”184 
 
The issue with this line of thought is that it assumes everything should be public knowledge because 
it cannot be used against you. One journalist, in a Time Article asserted: “’[T]he more I learned about 
data-mining, the less concerned I was. Sure, I was surprised that all these companies are actually 
keeping permanent files on me. But I don't think they will do anything with them that does me any 
 
181 SOLOVE supra note 31, at 21.  
182 Daniel J. Solove, 'I've Got Nothing to Hide' and Other Misunderstandings of Privacy, 44 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 745, 748 (2007). 
183 Id. at 749 (citing Polls Suggest Americans Approve NSA Monitoring (NPR radio broadcast, May 
19, 2006), available at 2006 WLNR 22949347). 
184 Id. (citing Joe Schneider, Letter to the Editor, NSA Wiretaps Necessary, ST. PAUL PIONEER 
PRESS, Aug. 24, 2006, at 11B). 
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harm,” further stating he was not worried because no human being ever reads your files.185 This line 
of thinking is dangerous because first, it fails to consider that some information may be perceived by 
government officials to be a pattern of criminal behavior, thereby giving the government a valid 
reason to monitor for criminal activity, and second, because these individuals sacrifice the rights of 
others because they do not care what happens to them.186 Furthermore, individuals could read the 
files if they choose, and if they were ever implicated in a crime, the government could seize the files 
and easily read about the individual’s whereabouts going back possibly decades.187 
 This mindset is overall detrimental, as it assists in the slow erosion of our privacy rights over 
time.188 For example, let us say the government begins to record our telephone conversations 
arbitrarily. The individuals who support the nothing to hide theory may shrug their shoulders and 
brush the records off as minimal or non-invasive because the telephone conversation recording is 
not widespread and according to them, may cause at least one crime to be solved. To them, the 
benefits outweigh the risks. Alternatively, let us say the government begins monitoring some 
people’s credit card statements in hopes of finding suspicious purchases. The individuals have not 
been flagged for suspicious purchases, rather the decision on whom to monitor is pure chance. They 
may claim the government does not want to cause harm, which may very well be true, but the 
release of records may cause inadvertent harm. The more people who have access to records the 
more of a chance they will be leaked or the wrong person will gain access to the records. At first 
blush, these two examples may sound incremental, but after a while, the government will have 
 
185 Witte, supra note 128, at 738-39.  
186 SOLOVE, supra note 31, at 29.  
187 Witte, supra note 128, at 739. 
188 Id. at 30.  
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collected information on each of us. What if the government takes this information and infers 
criminal activity?   
All or Nothing 
Privacy and national security need not be mutually exclusive; surrendering privacy does not 
necessarily make us more secure, but surrendering security does not necessarily equate to an erosion 
of our Fourth Amendment rights. It is possible to allow government oversight with “a degree of 
limitation” because the Fourth Amendment works by judicial oversight.189  
This framework does not account for the nuance of technology. What if I want to use 
Amazon Alexa to help organize my day, but I do not want it to provide my daily activities to the 
government freely? Currently, there are no provisions in place that would allow for me to 
accomplish this, other than not purchasing an Alexa (or other technology), due to the 
implementation and analysis of the third-party doctrine.  
This all or nothing mindset encompasses the third-party doctrine as it relates to technology 
not considered in Carpenter. Concerning CSLI and privacy cases that came before it, the All or 
Nothing Framework is better classified as Mostly All or Nothing. 
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ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS 
 
The Court is likely to address privacy jurisprudence, and new technologies, in the same 
piece-meal, incremental approach that has plagued old-fashioned common law. The Court has been 
reluctant to decide more than what stands before it, likely because judges do not feel they are able to 
fully understand contemporary technology or society’s increasing desire to incorporate technology 
into daily routines. Because this is the same issue that has brought us through Carpenter, it is 
imperative that society encourages private businesses or the legislature to step in and acknowledge 
our privacy rights. To incentivize companies to participate in safeguarding our privacy, it must be 
“valued by consumers as a commodity in its own right, much like organic foods have become a 
valued food type.”190  
 Companies should be held liable for the safety in the collection and transfer of data, 
whether using encryption on behalf of the company or partnerships with the government to 
encourage transparency. The technology giants, such as Apple and Microsoft, should stand on 
behalf of their customers against governmental intrusion. We rely on them to protect our interests 
because the government requests our data from them.  
A. Encryption 
Encryption is “the process of encoding information such that a key is required to decode 
it.”191 Encryption helps keep the information secret from anyone who is not intended to have access 
to it unless they possess a decryption key.192 Encryption prevents the government, or anyone else, 
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from gaining access to personal files and communications. Currently, encryption is used to secure a 
safe environment for internet commerce as well as institutional commerce, so it is not far off to 
assume wide deployment of encryption to the public in the future.193 This type of personal 
encryption would result in negative consequences for law enforcement, because encryption “makes 
it impossible, irrespective of warrants, for law enforcement to recover” the previously encrypted 
information.194 
One privacy scholar contends that encryption to protect against a cyber-intrusion is 
analogous to physical locks, bolts, and alarms in a physical intrusion.195 When encryption is afforded 
by companies, rather than individual consumers, the companies may provide discretionary access to 
the government as they have the key to decrypt. For example, WhatsApp offers end-to-end 
encryption for messages, voice calls, and videos.196 Nonetheless, it also stores this encryption and 
makes it available to law enforcement, if required.197 
In contrast, Apple has shown its unwillingness to support the government, despite its privacy 
policy.198 The most notable of these circumstances was when Apple would not create a backdoor for 
a deceased terrorist, Syed Farook, in San Bernardino, who had encrypted his cellphone.199 Apple was 
ordered by a federal magistrate judge to provide a backdoor to the government to allow federal 
 
193 Lin, supra note 140, at 1095-96. 
194 Id. at 1096.  
195 Couillard, supra note 191, at 2225 (citing 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on 
the Fourth Amendment § 2.6(f), at 721 (4th ed. 2004)). 
196 Pfefferkorn, supra note 192, at 1404 (citing Martin Shelton, Upgrading WhatsApp Security, Medium 
(Feb. 6, 2017), https://medium.com/@mshelton/upgrading-whatsapp-security-
386c8ce496d3#.ze0z63ifv [https://perma.cc/9BKP-72AM]. 
197 Id.  
198 See supra note 132 and accompanying text.  
199Apple Still Doesn’t Know How FBI Hacked San Bernardino Terrorist’s iPhone Without Their Help, FOX 
NEWS CHANNEL (Mar. 30, 2016), https://www.foxnews.com/tech/apple-still-doesnt-know-how-
fbi-hacked-san-bernardino-terrorists-iphone-without-their-help  
48 
 
investigators to see whether the terrorist was working alone.200 Apple denied this request, asserting 
its commitment to ensuring the privacy of its millions of customers.201 In the end, the government 
hacked the terrorist’s phone, no longer requiring Apple’s assistance.202 However, this is not to say 
Apple never hands over our data to the government; in fact, Apple can and does disclose Cloud data 
to law enforcement.203 The difference, theoretically, between these two cases is that in the terrorist 
attack, by providing the backdoor for the terrorist’s phone, the government could conceivably hack 
all iPhone users with the touch of a button, whereas with the Cloud the government must contact 
Apple in order to receive the information. It may also be possible that the market will provide and 
encourage individuals to better protect their privacy. As two technology advocates, Gershenfeld and 
Vasseur conclude: 
By extending cryptography down to the level of individual devices, the owners of 
those devices would gain a new kind of control over their personal information. 
Rather than maintaining secrecy as an absolute good, it could be priced based on the 
value of sharing. Users could set up a firewall to keep private the Internet traffic 
coming from the things in their homes--or they could share that data with, for 
example, a utility that gave a discount for their operating their dishwasher only 
during off-peak hours or a health insurance provider that offered lower rates in 
return for their making healthier lifestyle choices.204 
 
This suggestion allows consumers to choose whether or not they want to participate in the 
Internet of Things, and it gives them the privacy many individuals desire while also allowing 
them to stay connected.  
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B. Right to be Forgotten 
Many legal scholars have suggested a “right to be forgotten” law, which draws its support 
and history from European countries.205 This law is intended to secure private information for 
private individuals, as it allows individuals to have certain information deleted from search engines 
or places where internet records are stored.206 It strives to balance data protection and right of 
privacy with the public’s interest in access to the information. Critics contend that if a similar “right 
to be forgotten” law is adopted into law by Americans, there would be profound impacts on our 
First Amendment Constitutional rights of freedom of speech and freedom of the press.207 They 
claim it would be antithetical to one of our nation’s founding principles, the free flow of 
information; they claim it amounts to censorship.208 Secondly, they claim to allow private companies 
to remove certain information puts corporations in charge of enforcing our privacy rights; they 
would be the ones in charge of enforcing the balance between free speech and privacy.209 On the 
other hand, supporters of a right to be forgotten law in the United States say it will allow individuals 
to control their personal data. They argue that much of the information online can be used to 
damage individuals and their future.210 
Currently, there are laws that cover many aspects of personal privacy in transactions, but 
they are not as encompassing as the right to be forgotten. For example, there is the Health Insurance 
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Portability Accountability Act and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act.211 Both of these acts 
regulate the use of personal information.212 
C. Congressional Interception 
An essential feature in our society is the relationship between humans and the government; 
specifically, the checks and balances system that has been around since our nation’s founding 
enacted through the founding documents and the nature of our Republic. However, new 
developments in technology will continue to minimize third-party disclosures as consumers continue 
to prioritize the convenience given to them by smart technologies against their constitutional rights. 
Individuals should be more vigilant about what information they disclose. Additionally, companies 
should be held liable for the safety in the collection and transfer of data, whether through the use of 
encryption on behalf of the company or partnerships with the government to encourage 
transparency. Congress has the opportunity to craft legislation, with the Constitution in mind, that is 
amicable to law enforcement and the public, unlike the courts, which can only rule on cases and laws 
that come before it. 
Consumers could benefit from federal privacy legislation, as this would ensure at least a 
baseline that all companies would follow.213 As long as this baseline had consequences for those who 
do not comply, it would allow for nearly all companies to play by the same rules because the internet 
and other online devices cross state lines.214 The legislation should be broad enough to account for 
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rapidly changing technology, but narrow enough to ensure data security and privacy. If companies 
wanted to take additional precautions to protect privacy, they should be welcome to do so.  
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CONCLUSION 
  
The digital transition from physical papers and the well-known concept of “effects” is a 
dangerous time for our civil liberties. The enumeration of the Fourth Amendment protections 
reflects the Founders’ commitment to the development of thoughts, ideas, and beliefs. It is 
necessary that we read the Fourth Amendment to apply to all of the digital information, as a 
functional equivalent to the physical papers and effects that existed during the time of the Founding 
Fathers if we are to preserve the right to privacy for the future generations. The Founding Fathers 
could not have ever imagined the progression of technology, but their ideas and the foundation for 
why the Fourth Amendment protected certain things remains the same. 
Jurisprudence regarding privacy from the Supreme Court has been plentiful, but the Court’s 
decisions have focused on the devices rather than focusing on the types of information collected by 
devices in general. The cornerstone for many of these decisions have been the Fourth Amendment 
concept of reasonableness, but what is reasonable with electronic data is not consistent. As Smart 
devices and internet tracking become even more prevalent, there is an urgent need to end the third-
party doctrine and also reconsider the outdated nature of the Stored Communications Act. Carpenter 
was a step in the right direction for CSLI, but it does not consider the vast array of technologies and 
their ways of data collection yet to emerge.  
We must ensure the rights that were guaranteed by the Constitution at the time of founding is 
still applicable for digitization, regardless of the new technologies that develop in the IoT. The 
Constitution may have been written a long time before cellphones and the internet was devised, but 
the unwavering beliefs of personal autonomy and privacy. 
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Today, most of our information is stored on third-party servers; if this information can be 
obtained without a warrant, our Fourth Amendment privacy protections are meaningless. If the 
third-party doctrine, as it stands, were to be applied to the third-party doctrine and IoT, the 
government would be provided unlimited access to an individual’s personal information as part of a 
comprehensive IoT profile.  
In Carpenter, the Court declined to extend the third-party doctrine to the data collected by 
cell phones, but this narrow interpretation only leaves more questions than it answered. The smart 
home will soon be as much of a necessity to modern life as cell phones. This questions the very 
roots of the third party doctrine of voluntary conveyance and assumption of risk, thereby requiring a 
re-examination of the third-party doctrine.  
 We must encourage consumers to care about their privacy, and also advocate to private 
business the importance of privacy. If lawmakers wish to be involved, they should develop a 
comprehensive, timeless protocol to guide law enforcement in digital searches.  
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